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An Efficient and Fair Solution for Communication Graph Games
Brink, Rene van den; Khmelnitskaya, Anna; Laan, Gerard … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication graph the total payoff to the players of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867500
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Collective Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts
Dobbelaere, Sabien; Luttens, Roland Iwan - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium … wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate … that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867502
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New Characterizations for Largeness of the Core
Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness of the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization shows the relation between the bases that provide core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009132174
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Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games
Brink, Rene van den; Dietz, Chris - Tinbergen Institute - 2012
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391880
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228
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The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems
Algaba, Encarnacion; Bilbao, Jesus Mario; Brink, Rene … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
Cooperative games with partial cooperation cover a wider rank of real world situations than the classic model of cooperative games where every subset of a set of agents can form a coalition to execute the game. In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions which models the partial cooperation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293667
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Games on Union Closed Systems
Brink, Rene van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838573
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
Brink, Rene van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838630
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Axiomatizations of Two Types of Shapley Values for Games on Union Closed Systems
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964460
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Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964462