Similar Search Results

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without … deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous … start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Gigerenzer the Decided: A Tale of Difficult Distinctions

Heukelom, Floris - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper provides an overview of the work of Gigerenzer, thereby focusing on his criticisms of the Heuristics and Biases theory of Kahneman and Tversky. It is proposed that Gigerenzer's work can be both thematically and chronologically organized as: historical research on statistics =...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144545

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878

Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias

Offerman, Theo - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136955

Gift Exchange in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973

Rent-seeking versus Productive Activities in a Multi-task Experiment

Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

reciprocity, however, suggest that this relationship may go the other way around. In this paper we test these predictions by means … less attractive when the scope for rent-seeking activities increases. However, reciprocity motivations do seem to mitigate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137154

Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

in the size of the workforce and intention-based reciprocity rather than social preferences seems to be the main driving …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137214

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227

Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game

Neugebauer, Tibor; Poulsen, Anders; Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to test various models in one framework. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137274