-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …

implies that transaction costs as part of total costs of ownership carry a large weight in procurement decisions. An analysis …

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience … competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear. …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions and bidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has a …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We … approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction …