This paper examines the relationship between organization contextual variables and human resource management (HRM) practices in small firms. The proposed model is based on an integration of theoretical perspectives, including the resource-based approach, institutional theory, transaction cost...

Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...

We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...

Nobel laureates in economics make their most important and creative contributions

The most important financial source for behavioral economics is the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF). The most prominent behavioral economists among the RSF’s twenty-six member Behavioral Economics Roundtable (BER) are Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, Camerer, Loewenstein, Rabin, and Laibson. The...

Kahneman and Tversky and their behavioral economics stand in a long tradition of applying mathematics to human behavior. In the seventeenth century, attempts to describe rational behavior in mathematical terms run into problems with the formulation of the St. Petersburg paradox. Bernoulli’s...

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...

Management scholars have sought to answer the question: is there a financial payoff for ad-dressing ecological and social issues? We move beyond this question and include a time com-ponent for corporate financial performance (CFP) and a firm’s innovativeness in order to ask: when does it pay?...

This paper employs firm-level data to analyze the relative importance of firm characteristics and agglomeration externalities in explaining variation in innovation rates across firms. More specifically, we combine micro-data and census data to estimate the probability that a firm will introduce...