Showing 1 - 10 of 10
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016260
This paper associates a strategic <I>n</I>-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144450
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136982
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137089
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set … of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137108
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … distribution, where the utility of an agent is equal to its benefit from the water consumption plus its monetary transfer (which … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228
In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness … of the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization … shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009132174
cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to … coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838573
vector of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement of the core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core and the payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection of graphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core. <BR><BR> We conclude by some examples showing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281869
group’? A fourth type of contribution studied is the role of entrepreneurship in increasing individuals’ utility levels …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137206