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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631

Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered

Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046

The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100

Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction

Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137109

From Overt to Tacit Collusion

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Soetevent, Adriaan - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid the one-shot competitive equilibrium. Subjects in the experiment of … in the difficulty of the coordination problem they have to solve. The experimental results show that if the efforts of …, subjects manage to switch to a more intricate form of coordination. This shift from overt collusion to tacit collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136891

Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game

Neugebauer, Tibor; Poulsen, Anders; Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to test various models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137274

Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment

Offerman, Theo; Potters, Jan; Verbon, Harry A.A. - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infinite overlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is also the inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144485

Information and Strategic Voting

Tyszler, Marcelo; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838645

Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria

Galeotti, Andrea - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

I examine a search model a la' Burdett and Judd (1983). Consumers are embedded in a consumers network, they may costly search for price quotations and the information gathered are non-excludable along direct links. This allows me to explore the effect of endogenous consumers externalities on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504914

Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments

Hommes, Cars; Sonnemans, Joep; Tuinstra, Jan; Velden, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental en- vironment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard asset pricing model. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equa- tions, but they know all past realized prices and their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137028