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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639

Auctions, Market Prices and the Risk Attitude Effect

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market prof- its are uncertain so that winning an auction is like winning a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137048

Auctions under Payoff Uncertainty: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk

Hu, Audrey; Zou, Liang - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136943

Bidding to give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it right from the Start

Onderstal, Sander; Schram, Arthur J.C.; Soetevent, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003388

Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513212

Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions

Renes, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience … competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854554

Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation

Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137032

Continuous Time Trading in Markets with Adverse Selection

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for a durable good where trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuous time. In the continuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitatively different from the static equilibria, emerge....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144503

Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk

Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136889

Competition for a Prize

Noll, Rob van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136926