This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions and bidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has a …

approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …

, contractual, and legal solutions. Our results show that auctions (competition among many informed buyers) provide a solution to …

This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction …. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage …. If only one license is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction (license) as it will …

There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an …. This paper argues that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any public … auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two commonly used auctions …: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). Our results show that the leniency program does …. The results do not differ substantially across auction types although the deterrence effect of the leniency program is …

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest … bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two …-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are …

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous … bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except … Internet auctions. …

firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market prof- its are uncertain so that winning an auction is like winning a … lottery ticket. li one license is auctioned, auctions select the firm that is least risk averse. This is what we call the risk …