This paper examines the conception of individuals as being of certain types in Harsanyi's transformation of games of incomplete information into games of complete information. It argues that while the conception of the individual in games of complete information offers potential advances over...

A flat tax rate on income has gained popularity in European countries. This paper assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the least cost to labour market performance. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the...

In this paper I examine various extensions of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model with the purpose of fitting and forecasting the term structure of interest rates. As expected, I find that using more flexible models leads to a better in-sample fit of the term structure. However, I show that the...

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky price

We present a simple macroeconomic model with open market operations that allows examining the effects of quantitative and credit easing. The central bank controls the policy rate, i.e. the price of money in open market operations, as well as the amount and the type of assets that are accepted as...

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

<I>Abstract</I><p> See document.<p>

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...