Showing 1 - 7 of 7
In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set of admissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it cannot be guaranteed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144447
Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136985
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137089
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137108
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate with one another. We introduce a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137217
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838569
In this paper we generalize the concept of coalitional games by allowing for any organizational structure within coalitions represented by a graph on the set of players ot the coalition. A, possibly empty, set of payoff vectors is assigned to any graph on every subset of players. Such a game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281869