of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …

, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness … of the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization … shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …