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Smit, Han; Berg, Ward A. van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

This study presents a dynamic model for the private equity market in which information revelation and uncertainty rationally explain the cyclical pattern of investment flows into private equity. The net benefit of private equity over public equity is i) uncertain and ii) agents have private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209472

Disciplining and Screening Top Executives

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016271

Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game

Smit, Han T.J.; Berg, Ward A. van den; Maeseneire, Wouter De - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

This paper uses a unified treatment of real options and game theory to examine value appropriation in takeovers within a competitive environment of imperfect information. The integrated model considers a potential target as a shared real option on a bundle of resources. Competing potential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144572

Strategic versus Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting

Arping, Stefan; Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Institute

Strategic investors, such as corporate venture capitalists, engage in the financing of start-up firms to complement their core businesses and to facilitate the internalization of externalities. We argue that while strategic objectives make it more worthwhile for an investor to elicit high...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016265

Market Liquidity, Investor Participation and Managerial Autonomy: Why do Firms go Private?

Boot, Arnoud W.A.; Gopaian, Radhakrishnan; Thakor, Anjan V. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

We analyze a publicly-traded firm's decision to stay public or go private when managerial autonomy from shareholder intervention affects the supply of productive inputs by management. We show that both the advantage and the disadvantage of public ownership relative to private ownership lie in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450778

The Economic Value of Flexibility when there is Disagreement

Boot, Arnoud W.A.; Thakor, Anjan V. - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We develop an economic theory of “flexibility”, which we interpret as the discretion or ability to make a decision that others disagree with. We show that flexibility is essentially an option for the decisionmaker, and can be valued as such. The value of the flexibility option is decreasing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137042

Disagreement and Flexibility: A Theory of Optimal Security Issuance and Capital Structure

Boot, Arnoud W.A.; Thakor, Anjan V. - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

In this paper we introduce flexibility as an economic concept and apply it to the firm’s security issuance decision and capital structure choice. Flexibility is the ability to make decisions that one thinks are best even when others disagree. The firm’s management values flexibility because...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137258

Go Public or Stay Private: A Theory of Entrepreneurial Choice

Boot, Arnoud W.A.; Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Thakor, Anjan V. - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

In this paper we analyze an entrepreneur /manager's choice between private and public ownership in a setting in which management needs some "elbow room" or autonomy to optimally manage the firm. In public capital markets, the corporate governance regime in place exposes the firm to exogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504882

Winning by Losing: Evidence on Overbidding in Mergers

Malmendier, Ulrike; Moretti, Enrico; Peters, Florian - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

value? Answering this question is difficult since the hypothetical counterfactual is hard to determine. We exploit merger … winning the contest, the post-merger performance of the loser allows calculating the counterfactual performance of the winner … without the merger. In a novel data set of merger contests since 1985, we find that the returns of bidders are closely aligned …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209848

The Political Economy of Dominant Investors

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the corporate governance structure and the division of profits between human and financial capital. In a democratic society where financial wealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restrain governance by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137317

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