Similar Search Results

The Political Economy of Dominant Investors

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the corporate governance structure and the division of profits between human and financial capital. In a democratic society where financial wealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restrain governance by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137317

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, Lans; Teulings, Coen - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

efficiency, in the short run a generation of insiders has to give up their rights without benefiting from increased job creation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450728

Corporate Governance and Leverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Arping, Stefan; Sautner, Zacharias - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

We argue that the recent corporate governance reform in the Netherlands provides a natural experiment to explore the impact of changes in corporate governance on financing policy. We find that, relative to a control sample of comparable firms outside the Netherlands, Dutch firms significantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838637

The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance

Perotti, Enrico; Thadden, Ernst Ludwig von - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795583

Blockholder Dispersion and Firm Value

Konijn, Sander J.J.; Kraeussl, Roman; Lucas, Andre - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Blockholdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a more concentrated ownership structure. To test...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513240

Mean and Bold?

Witte, Kristof De; Dijkgraaf, Elbert - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

association started with a voluntary benchmarking aimed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector. Secondly … efficiency of these two evolutions. In particular, we adapt Free Disposal Hull (FDH) to estimate robust and conditional non …-oriented efficiency estimates. Parametric COLS (Fourier) tests show the robustness of the model with respect to the specification and its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504883

The Political Economy of Corporate Control

Perotti, Enrico; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042222

Did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 make Firms less Opaque? Evidence from Analyst Earnings Forecasts

Arping, Stefan; Sautner, Zacharias - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

We study whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 made firms less opaque. For identification, we use a difference-in-differences estimation approach and compare EU firms that are cross-listed in the US—and therefore subject to SOX—with comparable EU firms that are not cross-listed. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765731

Private Equity Waves

Smit, Han; Berg, Ward A. van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

This study presents a dynamic model for the private equity market in which information revelation and uncertainty rationally explain the cyclical pattern of investment flows into private equity. The net benefit of private equity over public equity is i) uncertain and ii) agents have private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209472

Disciplining and Screening Top Executives

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016271

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Next
Last