This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for...

This paper discusses the design, implementation and use of standards from the perspective of transaction costs economics. A proper design and implementation of standards may lead to a considerable reduction of transaction costs, which enhances trade and, consequently, economic welfare. A major...

Growth empirics with institutional measures is performed for 25 transition countries over the period 1990-95. Estimation results suggest that (particularly state) institutions are significant for growth and, especially, foreign direct investment (FDI), the latter in turn being important for the...

This study uses the methods of experimental economics to investigate possible causes for the failure of the Hotelling rule for nonrenewable resources. We argue that as long as resource stocks are high enough, producers may choose to (partially) ignore the dynamic component of their production...

Following formal privatisation of farm land and assets in Central Europe, the change in agricultural production structures has been both more limited and different than was initially expected. In this paper, the theoretical reasons underlying those expectations are reviewed. An alternative...

The nature of energy and material resources in an endogenous growth theory framework is clarified. This involves three modifications of the conventional theory. Firstly, multiple feedback mechanisms or “growth engines” are identified. Secondly, a production function distinguishes between...

This paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets high morale as team members working together productively, either because of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date,...

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...