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outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others’ past behavior before making their decision do …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144513
This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136955
This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137218
In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions on the payoff function <i>f</i> and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probability measures instead of the set of mixed strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450809
While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than … dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046
authority and responder. Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual real effort decision …-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137109
We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838587
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
This paper associates a strategic <I>n</I>-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...</i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144450