Similar Search Results

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.<BR><BR> … a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without … in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Who are the Behavioral Economists and what do they say?

Heukelom, Floris - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

The most important financial source for behavioral economics is the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF). The most prominent behavioral economists among the RSF’s twenty-six member Behavioral Economics Roundtable (BER) are Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, Camerer, Loewenstein, Rabin, and Laibson. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144399

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878

Experimental Public Choice

Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

A review is given of the use of laboratory experiments in the Public Choice literature. A distinction is made in experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136963

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974

Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments

Hommes, Cars; Sonnemans, Joep; Tuinstra, Jan; Velden, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental en- vironment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard asset pricing model. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equa- tions, but they know all past realized prices and their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137028

How Universal is Behavior?

Brandts, Jordi; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137040

Separating Real Incentives and Accountability

Vieider, Ferdinand M. - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137170

Understanding Contract Audits: An Experimental Approach

Bertrand, Robert M.M.; Schram, Arthur J.H.C.; Vaassen, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

such as defense procurement. This contradicts predictions from standard economic theory. We conduct a laboratory experiment … motivations to initiate contract audits, we measure our subjects' attitudes towards contract auditing and their level of perceived …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838562

Information and Strategic Voting

Tyszler, Marcelo; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur. In particular, we focus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838645