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The Degradation of Distorted Performance Measures

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137095

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513238

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227

Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations

Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838534

Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions

Herpen, Marco van; Cools, Kees; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144477

The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, C. Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small with a volatile environment where the noise is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144498

Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136986

Self-Selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study

Vyrastekova, Jana; Onderstal, Sander; Koning, Pierre - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting … high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual … incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838641

Tournament Incentives in The Field: Gender Differences in The Workplace

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987442

Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513212