In this paper I examine various extensions of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model with the purpose of fitting and forecasting the term structure of interest rates. As expected, I find that using more flexible models leads to a better in-sample fit of the term structure. However, I show that the...

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky price

We present a simple macroeconomic model with open market operations that allows examining the effects of quantitative and credit easing. The central bank controls the policy rate, i.e. the price of money in open market operations, as well as the amount and the type of assets that are accepted as...

We analyze financial support for the entrepreneurial sector. State support can raise welfare by relaxing financial constraints, but it can also reduce lending standards if entrepreneurs substitute public sources of collateral for their own assets, if it encourages excessive entrepreneurial...

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate

The stock market collapse led to political tensions between generations due to the fuzzy definition of the property rights over the pension funds’ wealth. The problem is best resolved by the introduction of generational accounts. Modern consumption and portfolio theory shows that the younger...

See 'Political Connections And Preferential Access To Finance: The Role Of Campaign Contributions' in <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBX-4P3DY39-4&_user=499884&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1004038141&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000024499&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=499884&md5=d48c00bd293b73b16a75eb763ff75630"><I>Journal of Financial Economics</I>, 2008, 88(3), 554-580</A>.

This paper addresses the issue of the choice of the optimal instrument to sell new shares, this choice being price versus quantity discrimination (rationing). Previous results in the literature (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990) show that the issuing firm would be better off if allowed to use both...

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context when banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. When capital raising is costly, poorly...