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Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation
Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137032
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Signals in Science - On the Importance of Signaling in Gaining Attention in Science
Dalen, Hendrik P. van; Henkens, Kène - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
citations. Three types of signals are examined: the author’s reputation (as producer of the idea), the journal (as the broker of … empirical analysis points out that, first, the reputation of journals plays an overriding role in gaining attention in science … third, the reputation of a journal may help to get late recognition (so-called ‘sleeping beauties’) as well as generate so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795584
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Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data
Abbring, Jaap; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137061
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Asymmetric Information and List Price Reductions in the Housing Market
Wit, Erik R. de; Klaauw, Bas van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
In housing markets with asymmetric information list prices may signal unobserved properties of the house or the seller. Asymmetric information is the starting point of many models for the housing market. In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of list-price reductions to test for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838556
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Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Veelen, Matthijs van - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and how neutrally stable strategies can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144499
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In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Veelen, Matthijs van; Garcia, Julian - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838642
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Why Are Residents Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians?
Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016275
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A Simple Model of Self-Assessments
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments of
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036249
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
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On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838653