Showing 1 - 10 of 153
There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. This paper argues that these inefficiencies can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513243
Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136936
We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to test various models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137274
A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a bid for each object and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get in case they have the highest bid on more than one object....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137312
uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty …, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450754
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838636
This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456
This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op- erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket compared to a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argument are differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137048
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
This paper uses a unified treatment of real options and game theory to examine value appropriation in takeovers within a competitive environment of imperfect information. The integrated model considers a potential target as a shared real option on a bundle of resources. Competing potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144572