Parents’ transfer motives are important for understanding, e.g., macroeconomics, income (re)distribution, savings, and public finance. Using data from six biennial waves of the Health and Retirement Study 1992–2002, we estimate grouped tobit-type latent variable models with multi-level error...

In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperative behavior in a dynamic model of population interaction. The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay- off of each individual is partly based on the (local) interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform)...

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are...

There is increasing empirical and experimental evidence that providing financial incentives to agents to perform certain socially desirable actions may permanently reduce other types of motivations to undertake these actions. We study the impact of financial incentives on the desire for social...

There has been a revival of interest in the effect of risk on economic growth. We quantify both ex ante and ex post effects of risk using a stochastic version of the Ramsey model. We develop a simulation-based econometric methodology which allows us to estimate the model in the structural form...

In this paper the efficient allocation of natural recreational areas is analysed. Natural recreational areas have the features of public goods. We present the efficient allocation of this non-excludable public good in a rational general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. This allows us...

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

<I>Abstract</I><p> See document.<p>