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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137083
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
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Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game
Neugebauer, Tibor; Poulsen, Anders; Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002
We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to test various models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137274
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Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment
Janssen, Maarten C.W. - Tinbergen Institute - 2000
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high ability workers (hipo's) in situations of unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger a firm's incentives to sort high and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their (high) ability in situations of (high)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209524
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Terrorist Targeting, Information, and Secret Coalitions
Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; McCormick, Gordon; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513219
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Information Overload in Monopsony Markets
Ficco, Stefano - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
I consider a situation in which heterogenous senders (applicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes imperfect signals (applications) to screen among applicants. The information-processing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137222
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Control without Deception
Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000
in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more … sensitive to free-riding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that … explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.<BR><BR> …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962
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Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000
We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974
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Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment
Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 1996
The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137243
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Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137218