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Who are the Behavioral Economists and what do they say?

Heukelom, Floris - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

The most important financial source for behavioral economics is the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF). The most prominent behavioral economists among the RSF’s twenty-six member Behavioral Economics Roundtable (BER) are Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, Camerer, Loewenstein, Rabin, and Laibson. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144399

Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity And The Effectiveness Of Leniency Programs in Experimental Auctions

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). Our results show that the leniency program does not affect the average winning bid, nor the average...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531423

Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752907

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878

Control without Deception

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more … sensitive to free-riding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that … explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.<BR><BR> …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Experimental Public Choice

Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

A review is given of the use of laboratory experiments in the Public Choice literature. A distinction is made in experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136963

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974

Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments

Hommes, Cars; Sonnemans, Joep; Tuinstra, Jan; Velden, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental en- vironment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard asset pricing model. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equa- tions, but they know all past realized prices and their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137028

How Universal is Behavior?

Brandts, Jordi; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137040

Separating Real Incentives and Accountability

Vieider, Ferdinand M. - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137170