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Who are the Behavioral Economists and what do they say?

Heukelom, Floris - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

division can be observed within behavioral economics. The first branch considers human decision-making to be a problem of … exogenous uncertainty, which can be analyzed with decision theory. It employs traditional economics as a nor! mative benchmark … and favors a normative-descriptive(-prescriptive) distinction for economics. The second branch considers human decision …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144399

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878

Control without Deception

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making "others' behaviour" a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Experimental Public Choice

Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

A review is given of the use of laboratory experiments in the Public Choice literature. A distinction is made in experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136963

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974

Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments

Hommes, Cars; Sonnemans, Joep; Tuinstra, Jan; Velden, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental en- vironment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard asset pricing model. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equa- tions, but they know all past realized prices and their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137028

How Universal is Behavior?

Brandts, Jordi; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137040

Separating Real Incentives and Accountability

Vieider, Ferdinand M. - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137170

Understanding Contract Audits: An Experimental Approach

Bertrand, Robert M.M.; Schram, Arthur J.H.C.; Vaassen, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

Contract audits aimed at reducing information asymmetry and transaction costs are frequently used in imperfect markets such as defense procurement. This contradicts predictions from standard economic theory. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate this paradox. Our laboratory setup...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838562

Information and Strategic Voting

Tyszler, Marcelo; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur. In particular, we focus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838645