The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...

We analyze the phenomenon of hub dominance by developing a model relating fares to distance, using the main leg of intercontinental flights for scaling purposes. Our results indicate that at least some of the major European carriers place a mark up on flights originating from or going to their...

Conventional economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports. Several characteristics of aviation markets, however, may make naive congestion prices equal to the value of marginal...

In the process of regulatory reform in the electric power industry, the mitigation of market power is one of the basic problems regulators have to deal with. We use experimental data to study the sources of market power with supply function competition, akin to the competition in wholesale...

Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...

Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...