This discussion paper led to an article in <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2012), pp. 120-138.<P> We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered,...</p></i>

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...

In this paper we investigate whether markets with heterogeneous network externalities can belocked-in by old technologies even if superior technologies are available. Heterogeneous networkexternalities are present when some consumers care more about the size of the market share of agood than...

Although the literature converges regarding the reasons why and how networks of technology alliances are formed, there is still lack of agreement on what constitutes an optimal network structure, once it has been formed. The aim of this paper is to fill this void and to determine what...

We analyze patterns and determinants of technology alliance formation with partner firms from emerging economies, with a focus on European firms' alliance strategies. We examine to what extent European firms' alliance formation with partners based in emerging economies is persistent, that is: to...

We examine how and to what extent the propensity to be engaged in alliances with different partner types (suppliers, customers and competitors) depends on prior alliance engagement with partner firms of the same type (persistence) and prior engagement in alliances with the other partner types...