This paper analyzes how bankruptcy litigation affects the value of relationship banking. In our model, bankruptcy courts may make type 1 errors, i.e., they may declare that an insolvent firm is solvent; and they may make type 2 errors, i.e., they may declare that a solvent firm is insolvent. Our...

This paper constructs a theoretical model that integrates the two objectives of capital adequacy requirements and deposit insurance, namely avoiding banking crises and protecting small depositors. The paper also addresses the related question : why do banks fund loans with both equity and demand...

Nous introduisons la garantie des dépôts dans une version modifiée du modèle de Diamond (1984). Nous faisons les deux hypothèses suivantes. Premièrement, il y a des limites à la diversification du portefeuille de prêts. Deuxièmement, la distribution de probabilités des revenus du...

This note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank's assets, he liquidates them prematurely in order to protect his...