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uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256619
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Journal of Game Theory', 40, 87-110.<P> A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255491
In the literature, there exist several models where a cooperative TU-game is enriched with a hierarchical structure on the player set that is represented by a digraph. We consider games under precedence constraints introduced by Faigle and Kern (1992) who also introduce a generalization of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255563
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255646
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255779
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255955
See also the publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2009, 67, 303-340. A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256088
This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2008, 64, 519-536. A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256099