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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556

Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers

Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257

Characterizations of Network Power Measures

Brink, René van den; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2008, 64, 519-536. A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256099

Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256320

Capacity Choice of Dams under Rivalry Use and Externalities

Houba, Harold; Do, Kim Hang Pham; Zhu, Xueqin - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

This paper studies the relation between optimal dam capacity and water management under rivalry uses and externalities. We extend the hydropower generation model, based on Haddad (2011), by including the competing use of water resource, non-linear building cost of dam capacity and externalities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257002

The Economics of Transboundary River Management

Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the last decade due to increasing concerns over water scarcity and pollution. We outline the major approaches and pay specific attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257048

Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures

Funaki, Yukihiko; Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255451

Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining

Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255513

Costless Delay in Negotiations

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255692

The Condorcet Paradox Revisited

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255823