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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556

Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers

Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Journal of Game Theory', 40, 87-110.<P> A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255491

Characterizations of Network Power Measures

Brink, René van den; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2008, 64, 519-536. A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256099

Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256320

Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games

Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, Vitaly - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255790