Showing 1 - 10 of 10
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
Harsanyi set is related to the Core and Weberset. We also characterize the Harsanyi mapping as the unique mappingsatisfying a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256545
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256619
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257230
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257
This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2008, 64, 519-536. A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256099
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256320
See also the publication in 'Journal of Mathematical Economics', 2008, 44, 1114-1125. <P> In this paper we describe the extreme points of two closely related polytopes that are assigned to a digraph. The first polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256717
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economicallocation problems have gained popularity. To understandthese applications better, economic theory studies thesimilarities and differences between them. The purpose of thispaper is to investigate a special class of cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257395
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257497