Of the two most widely estimated univariate asymmetric conditional volatility models, the exponential GARCH (or EGARCH) specification can capture asymmetry, which refers to the different effects on conditional volatility of positive and negative effects of equal magnitude, and leverage, which...

Of the two most widely estimated univariate asymmetric conditional volatility models, the exponential GARCH (or EGARCH) specification can capture asymmetry, which refers to the different effects on conditional volatility of positive and negative effects of equal magnitude, and leverage, which...

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...