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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2010, 68, 626-633. We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465

On Hierarchies and Communication

Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2012, 39, 721-735. Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256206

Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation

Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

-179. In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One … of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In … a value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256829

On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues

Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Reijnierse, Hans - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net profit that the … coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the … cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257152

Positional Wages, Market Wages and Firm Size

Brink, Rene van den; Ruys, Pieter H.M. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

We model a firm in an institutional market setting, consisting of a production technology and its governance. The governance consists of a hierarchical firm structure, a cost efficiency parameter,and an internal pay system. The depth of the firm is determined by profit maximization under the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257470

An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value for Cooperative Games on Antimatroids

Algaba, E.; Bilbao, J.M.; Brink, R. van den; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Mathematical Methods of Operations Research', 59, 147-166. Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257583