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Resource Extraction in a Political Economy Framework

Ryszka, Karolina - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

We analyze resource extraction in a political economy setting by introducing a political leader who optimizes both his own and the society's welfare function. We find that accounting for the private utility of a political elite, its higher discount rate and a different time horizon generally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256563

Is there really a Green Paradox?

Ploeg, Frederick van der; Withagen, Cees - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069612000927">'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>, 2012, 64(3), 342-363.<P> Optimal climate policy is studied in a Ramsey growth model with exhaustible oil reserves, an infinitelyelastic supply of renewables, stock-dependent oil extraction...</p></a>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256971

Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines, ensure abnormal cartel profits and impose a … lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. For a range of low cartel prices, the fine is set … to the legal minimum. Raising minimum fines will enable the cartel to raise its price and is better avoided. Our analysis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255939

The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to … collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256040

Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge

Katsoulacos, Yannis; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather … of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue … conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261929

Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We derive the optimal fine schedule that achieves …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256547

The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are … we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which the … conditions for sustainability hold. We analyze how the maximal cartel price supported by different cartel strategies adjusts in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256899

Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently … close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257337

Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257358