. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non …-pay auction and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the … anomaly. First, participation in the all-pay auction is substantially lower than in the other mechanisms while the average …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

, afterwards, subjects take part in a second price auction for the right to (physically) carry out the act of payoff reduction …

. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience … competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear. …

implies that transaction costs as part of total costs of ownership carry a large weight in procurement decisions. An analysis …