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-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income …-69, as: 'Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment'. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255559
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255774
organize data well in previous experiments meant to test other concepts. This experiment provides the first systematic test of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256730
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257267
price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid the one-shot competitive equilibrium. Subjects in the experiment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256158
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</I> (2008), volume 66, pages 243-250.<P> We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256827
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257625
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257415