Some 2000 years ago, the average annual distance a person would normally travel, was approximately 500 km. The action radius of most people remained rather stable, but it rose gradually after the industrial revolution to some 1820 km (by car, bus, railway or aircraft) in the year 1960. Then, a...

See also the article in <I>Cities</I> (2013). Volume 30, pages 59-67.<P> This paper introduces a new measure to approach the accessibility of places in the frame of the digital economy. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the Internet are not equally spread around places and this...</p></i>

This paper discusses the value that data from mobile phone providers can bring into urban analysis. The novel argument is that the pervasiveness of mobile phone telephony has transformed mobile phones from a communications device to a tool for socio-spatial research. Put simply, mobile phone...

The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

We develop a method to screen for local cartels. We first test whether there is statistical evidence of clustering of outlets that score high on some characteristic that is consistent with collusive behavior. If so, we determine in a second step the most suspicious regions where further...

Basing-point pricing is known to have been abused by geographically dispersed firms in order to eliminate competition on transportation costs. This paper develops a topographic test for collusive basing-point pricing. The method uses transaction data (prices, quantities) and customer project...

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...

To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, detection probabilities are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. It follows that for a trigger strategy to sustain a non-cooperative collusive equilibrium as a SPNE both the discount rate and all per-period detection probabilities have...

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...