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The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … of the feasible policies.In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimalallocation of political … as the choicebetween two alternative legislative rules: open versus closed rule.We show that, in presence of lobbying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257116

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257421

Learning Dynamics and the Support for Economic Reforms: Why Good News can be Bad

Wijnbergen, Sweder van; Willems, Tim - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

paradox, the reason being that the process of revealing reform outcomes is an example of sampling without replacement: every … identity (reform winner or loser?) more pessimistic about their chances of benefiting from the reform. Consequently, learning … considerations challenge the conventional wisdom that sequencing should be such that favorable reform outcomes are revealed first …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255925

Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions

Goeree, Jacob; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in Experimental Economics 2013, 16(1), 52-87. Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256938

Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk

Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257219

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256524

Why does Centralisation fail to internalise Policy Externalities?

Dur, Robert A.J.; Roelfsema, Hein J. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision makingresults in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others.We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision.If all of the costs of public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256583

Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

Beniers, Klaas J.; Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256630

The Optimal Degree of Polarization

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'European Journal of Political Economics', 2004, 20, 255-262. In the literature on electoral politics full convergence of policy platforms is usually regarded as socially optimal. Thereason is that risk-averse voters prefer a sure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256641

The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for Herd Behavior

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256752