new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are …

positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between … defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and …

cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only …-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity. …This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2010, 68, 626-633. <P> We study …

this paper we consider games with limited communication structure in which the edges or links of an undirected graph on the … nodes in corresponding communication graphs. Special attention is given to the Harsanyi degree solution which equals the … transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or …

the player set that is represented by a digraph. We consider games under precedence constraints introduced by Faigle and … Kern (1992) who also introduce a generalization of the Shapley value for such games. They characterized this solution by … efficiency, linearity, the null player property and hierarchical strength which states that in unanimity games the payoffs are …

an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned …-Dreze value for games with coalition structures, the Myerson value for communication graph games and the equal surplus division … into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of …

In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in … Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the … players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model the communication network by a directed graph and the cooperative game by a …

cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division …