group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,what should be the basis for this favoritism? To … citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes receivedby the corrupt government …

first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while …We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting … where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product …

corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal … collusion could thus yield higher total surplus. …

. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non …-pay auction and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the … anomaly. First, participation in the all-pay auction is substantially lower than in the other mechanisms while the average …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …