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Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255513
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Costless Delay in Negotiations
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255692
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The Condorcet Paradox Revisited
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255823
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Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut
This discussion paper resulted in an article in <I>Economics Letters</I> (2007). Vol. 96, pp. 316-324.<P> The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256390
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Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
Calcagno, Riccardo; Lovo, Stefano - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257235
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Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257339
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Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
See also 'Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences', <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2011), Vol. 73, pp.507–516.<P> We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257375
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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256157
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
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Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249546