This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Annals of Operations Research' (forthcoming).<P> We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted...</p>

In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economics Letters', 2012, 117, 786-789.<P> We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom...</p>

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...