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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.This paper has been accepted by <A href …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257530

Radical Innovation and Network Evolution

Phlippen, Sandra; Riccaboni, Massimo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

This paper examines how a radical technological innovation affects alliance formation of firms and subsequent network structures. We use longitudinal data of interfirm R&D collaborations in the biopharmaceutical industry in which a new technological regime is established. Our findings suggest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257059

Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256628

Over- and Under-Bidding in Tendering

Berg, Vincent van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271950

Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255455

Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory

Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255466

Auctions with Flexible Entry Fees

Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

This discussion paper led to an article in Games and Economic Behavior (2011). Vol. 72, pp. 594-601. There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255544

Bidding to give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it right from the Start

Onderstal, Sander; Schram, Arthur J.C.; Soetevent, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the Journal of Public Economics (2013). Volume 105, pages 72-85. In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255620

An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders

Laan, Gerard van der; Yang, Zaifu - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255632

Tender Auctions with Existing Operators Bidding

Berg, Vincent A.C. van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

Consider a government tendering a facility, such as an airport or utility, where one bidder owns a competing facility. With a "standard auction", this "existing operator" bids above the auctioned facility's expected profit, as winning means being a monopolist instead of a duopolist. This auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255650