This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Journal of Game Theory', 40, 87-110.<P> A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for...</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Annals of Operations Research </I>, 2015, 225, 27-44.<P> This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied...</p></i>

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...

In the literature, there exist several models where a cooperative TU-game is enriched with a hierarchical structure on the player set that is represented by a digraph. We consider games under precedence constraints introduced by Faigle and Kern (1992) who also introduce a generalization of the...

In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate with one another. We introduce a new...

There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Public Choice', 151, 757-787. <P> Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organizations. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in...</p>

This discussion paper led to a chapter in 'Power, Freedom and Voting' (eds. M. Braham and F. Steffen), Springer, pp 57-81, 2008.<p> Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organisations. In this paper we consider positional power in hierarchies. One of the problems with the extant...</p>

A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...

Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...