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Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana; Vardy, Felix - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255815

Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255455

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two … each manager tries to sway the employee's effort his way. While this may result in too much social exchange, the attention …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255514

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127

Leniency Bias in Long-Term Workplace Relationships

Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256342

Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations

Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

In many workplaces co-workers have the best information about each other's effort. Managers may attempt to exploit this information through peer evaluation. I study peer evaluation in a pure moral hazard model of production by two limitedly liable agents. Agents receive a signal about their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256614

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257176

Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257180

Gift Exchange in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more … convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways … than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257203