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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … network and other parameters. Given the complexity of the system we use a standard technique for estimating the solution. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256157
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Exploitation and Cooperation in Networks
Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez, Miguel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
that the individual's incentives depend on the architecture of the network as well as on the position of the individual … within the network. In particular, when an efficient interaction requires players to mutually cooperate, efficient social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257046
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The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Instituut - 1999
-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income …-69, as: 'Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment'. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255559
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Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction
Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255774
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An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
organize data well in previous experiments meant to test other concepts. This experiment provides the first systematic test of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700
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Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256730
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Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257267
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Confirming Information Flows in Networks
Billand, Pascal; Bravard, Christophe; Kamphorst, Jurjen; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. In many networks agents will value confirmation of the information they receive from others. Our paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255900
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One-way Flow Networks: the Role of Heterogeneity
Galeotti, Andrea - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are asymmetric and central players may emerge. Second, I show that non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256410