We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes. Theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side, in which senders either use costless messages, money, or a combination of the two....

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in 'Games and Economic Behavior' (2013). Volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60.<P> Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer...</p>

We replicate the landmark study of Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) to examine whether individuals in China are prone to money illusion. We find that money illusion is prevalent in China as well. Respondents in the Chinese sample are often somewhat more likely to base decisions on the real...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'European Economic Review' (2013). Vol. 61, pp. 186-204.<P> Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve...</p>

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...