We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new …

both variables are chosen simultaneously. We also discuss Stackelberg game structures and second-best regulation. We …

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which … give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising … from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for the incumbent and lower cost of servicing for the entrant as a …

sets fares in a congestible network. Using three models, with different spatial structures, we describe the operator …-differentiation. The network models show that results obtained for a single-link network can be generalized to a situation where operators …

asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem … of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. However, CVaR regulation … welfare. CVaR regulation also affects the operation of monetary policy. …

. Another important determining factor is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the moment of entry: it is significantly easier to …

time effects. All countries display a massive reallocation of resources, with the entry and exit of many firms in all … market contestability. There are also large differences across groups of countries. While entry and exit rates are fairly … similar across industrial countries, post entry performance differs markedly between Europe and the U.S., a potential …

by both high entry and high exit rates. …