to screen industries that traditionally apply delivered pricing for the presence of cartels. We operationalize this … screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel … was found to have abused the basing-point system, our method can be used to estimate antitrust damages. …

illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of … collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …

response to the introduction of (ex-ante and ex-post) leniency programs. We disentangle the effects of traditional antitrust … below the price under antitrust without leniency. On the other hand, for ex-post leniency, improvement is possible and …

antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …

recovery of antitrust damages to direct purchasers. However, antitrust damages are typically (in part) passed on to … private damages. The cartel can achieve this by rationing inputs at low prices. Several U.S. antitrust cases show symptoms of …

We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model, contrasting national and multilateral …

conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e.,remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …

We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facinguncertain antitrust enforcement and …