We consider equilibrium and optimum use of a Vickrey road bottleneck, distinguishing between long-run and short-run scheduling preferences in an otherwise stylized scheduling model. The preference structure reflects that there is a distinction between the (exogenous) 'long-run preferred arrival...

In this paper we perform a meta-analysis on empirical estimates of the impact between investment and uncertainty. Since the outcomes of primary studies are largely incomparable with respect to the magnitude of the effect, our analysis focuses on the direction and statistical significance of the...

The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible...

This paper analyses the role of information in the search process. Ibuild a simple model of a good with two random attributes with somejoint probability distribution. I consider seemingly unimportant changesin this distribution, i.e. changes which neither affect expected utility norits variance....

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292111000912">'European Economic Review'</A>, 56(2) 216-32.<P>This paper is concerned with a policy oriented macroeconomic experiment involving an 'international' economy with a relatively small 'home' country and a large 'foreign' country. It compares the economic...</p></a>

Earlier studies on scheduling behavior have mostly ignored that consumers have more flexibility to adjust their schedule in the long run than in the short run. We introduce the distinction between long-run choices of travel routines and short-run choices of departure times, using data from a...

The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces...

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...